Abstract. Recent accounts of the role of diagrams in mathematical reasoning take a Platonic line, according to which the proof depends on the similarity between the perceived shape of the diagram and the shape of the abstract object. This approach is unable to explain proofs which share the same diagram in spite of drawing conclusions about different figures. Saccheri's use of the birectangular isosceles quadrilateral in Euclides Vindicatus provides three such proofs. By forsaking abstract objects it is possible to give a natural explanation of Saccheri's proofs as well as standard geometric proofs and even number-theoretic proofs.
18th centuries. To deny that they play an essential role in proof is to disparage the methods and results upon which present day mathematics rests. Moreover, the formalist conception of proof arose only after mathematicians developed the notion of abstract structure in the 19th century (cf. Mueller 1969, 298-9; Nagel 1979) ; and only at that time were axioms (such as Pasch's) articulated in order that results which depended previously upon a diagram could be proved by a finite, inspectable array of sentences. Diagrams are, as well, still important in mathematics education. Plainly the movement to accord diagrams a substantial role in mathematics is crucial to a philosophy of real mathematics.
Thus far, philosophical accounts of diagrams have proceeded along Platonist lines: Diagrams are a more or less reliable means of learning about objects outside the causal nexus. Brown is unabashedly Platonist. He asserts that in a wide variety of cases a good diagram works by being isomorphic to the situation it represents (1999, 38) . And in those cases for which there is no isomorphism -cases in which pictures are not really pictures -diagrams still function as "windows to Plato's heaven" (39). Thus, for Brown, diagrams provide access to abstract objects. According to Lomas, [T]he perception of shape properties of concrete diagrams is a surrogate for conscious awareness of shape properties of abstract geometric objects depicted in the diagrams. (210, his italics)
Here too diagrams are, in virtue of their perceptual properties, assumed to point beyond themselves to abstract objects. Giaquinto's discussion of the diagram in Plato's Meno (82bff.) makes a similar point: It requires that the inexact diagram be seen as an exact one (1993, 90) . The subsequent analysis of seeing as proposes that [ The diagram] must look similar to something which appears exactly square. Seeing the diagram as a square involves both seeing it and observing this similarity of appearance. (ibid.) This comment needn't imply Platonism, as an empirically admissible account of "appearing exactly square" is not out of the question.
Giaquinto doesn't provide one, however, and he's apparently not inclined in that direction because he writes that mathematics is for "getting information about things that [are] not before one's eyes" (95).
It's no accident that Plato used a mathematical diagram as his paradigm case of worldly objects that enable one to recollect the realities which they resemble; the analysis of diagrammatic reasoning along Platonistic lines is perfectly natural. But the appeal to abstract objects presents special problems for an account of diagrammatic reasoning, problems in addition to the usual complaints about epistemic access to abstract objects. For the perceptual properties of diagrams are themselves insufficient to account for a certain variety in the results of diagrammatic reasoning, viz., proofs which share the same diagram in spite of the fact that their conclusions concern figures which are incompatible with one another. §1 presents such a case, Saccheri's use of the bi-rectangular, isosceles quadrilateral (cf. appendix ; Saccheri 1920; Sherry 1999) .
Platonic accounts of diagrammatic reasoning, which depend on a similarity between the perceived shape of the diagram and the shape of the abstract object, cannot explain Saccheri's use of the same diagram in proving theorems about radically incompatible figures. Fortunately, there is no need to appeal to abstract objects in order to give an account of the role of diagrams in mathematical argument. In explaining how such reasoning is possible §2 presents an account of diagrammatic reasoning that makes no use of abstract objects. Instead the account is built from an analysis of the manner in which mathematics is applied to concrete objects. Both the usual problems with abstract objects and the special one just mentioned are avoided in the alternative I'm proposing. Finally, §3 shows that this analysis can be extended to diagrammatic reasoning outside of geometry, in particular to the number theoretic proofs which lead Brown to propose that some diagrams are best understood as windows to Plato's heaven. §1. The summit line CD of a Saccheri quadrilateral whose summit angles are right is equal to the base AB.
The summit line CD of a Saccheri quadrilateral whose summit angles are obtuse is less than the base AB.
The summit line CD of a Saccheri quadrilateral whose summit angles are acute is greater than the base AB. Apparently, the theorem does not result from inspecting a less than exact diagram, since the desired result is nowhere to be seen. Yet the diagram is not merely an heuristic device here. It's necessary, for example, in locating the bisector of the summit angle as intersecting the opposite side (a tidbit of topological information); indeed, existence assertions and relations of incidence are often justified by a diagram (cf. Greaves 2002, 20) . In suitable circumstances one might reject this proof as too informal, but no one would reject it simply because the diagram fails to satisfy the conditions of the theorem. To see why this is so, it's necessary to look more closely at the activity of letting a diagram be ".
Letting a diagram be " is the conscious activity of a subject, not the causal result of a subject's seeing a diagram and observing the similarity of appearance between the diagram and something which appears exactly ". Since authors concerned with diagrams often discuss them in the context of the geometrical demonstration in Plato's Meno, it will be instructive to use this example to illustrate the subject's conscious activity.
Socrates begins the demonstration by drawing a figure (fig. 5 ).
[
Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a square?
The boy replied, I do. angles, and the figure should be roughly convex. The point of
Socrates' first question is to determine whether the slave understands the characteristics necessary for an empirical object to be treated as a square. But the capacity to treat the diagram as a square also requires being a competent participant in inferential practices involving terms like "square," "line," and "equal." So, once the slave acknowledges that the diagram is the kind of object that can be treated as a square, Socrates proceeds by checking whether, regardless of appearance, the slave deduces correct conclusions given the stipulation that the figure is a square. The answer to the question "are the four (Greaves 2002, 29-31) . Thus, the summit angles of Saccheri's figure have no exact magnitude until after one treats them as instances of exact concepts.
One treats the elements of a diagram as instances of a mathematical concept because doing so enables one to draw further inferences about elements of the diagram in accordance with rules already at one's disposal. For instance, after treating AC and BC in suggestion that the diagram is ambiguous in the way Jastrow's duckrabbit is. fig. 4 as equal and the two angles formed by the ray CD as equal, sideangle-side warrants the inference that #ACD is congruent with #BCD.
This conclusion, and further rules, warrant further conclusions. In this respect the Meno demonstration and Saccheri's proofs proceed similarly.
To avoid abstract objects I appeal to inference rules in this context, rather than mathematical truths. Doing so makes more sense of the Meno demonstration than Plato's own appeal to recollection. In order to make his case that learning is recollection, Socrates purports to be conversing with an individual who has not been taught geometry,
and Meno swears this is the case (85e). But Meno also certifies that the slave is a competent speaker of Greek (82b), and this, I take it, includes having mastered deductive techniques that enable members of the community to exchange money for goods, construct buildings, etc.
Without these skills, the demonstration could never get off the ground, as the slave hasn't been taught pure mathematics, and observation of the diagram is insufficient for the answers he gives. Indeed, Plato lends plausibility to the idea of recollection only by ignoring the practical background which makes possible the discussion between
Socrates and the slave. Conversely, recollection loses its plausibility to the extent that the slave boy's discovery can be tied to his practical training.
Calling attention to the practical foundation of the Meno demonstration emphasizes that the diagram's role is precisely that played by any physical object -a farmer's field, a building, a roomful of guests and morsels of food, etc. We learn more about a diagram just as we learn more about physical objects, viz., by applying mathematical concepts and drawing inferences in accordance with mathematical rules.
Recognizing that a diagram is just one among other physical objects is the crucial step in understanding the role of diagrams in mathematical argument.
Simple empirical features of objects -that they can be counted, A proposition corresponding to this regularity, say, "combining a group of five with a group of seven yields a group of twelve," is, by virtue of its use, hardened into a rule for inferring one empirical proposition from another. That is, certain possibilities are excluded from our experience, and someone who combines groups of five and seven to obtain a group larger or smaller than twelve must have miscounted.
Inferences that depend on a diagram are similar. It is surely an empirical regularity that a ray drawn from a vertex through the interior of a triangle intersects the opposite side. But, unlike the arithmetic case, the regularity is so obvious that no one bothers to ff.). But when geometry is construed as a set of inference rules applicable to objects of experience, the conclusion that the ray emerging from one angle of a triangle intersects the side opposite is as necessary as any, even though its warrant may be a diagram.
Inference rules arising from empirical regularities are important enough to examine in the context of a different example, the principle of superposition. The principle of superposition licenses one to infer the equality of lines, angles and areas from determining that certain of their elements can be made to coincide (cf. Heath 1956, vol. 1, 225 ). It's plausible that Meno's slave agrees that the diagonal bisects the square (84e) on the basis of superposition. The principle of superposition also arises from empirical regularities, the results of placing one brick on top of another, folding paper or cloth back on itself, etc. Ritual altars were, in fact, constructed using the rule that the parts of a brick broken along the diagonal could be insights." The latter remark suggests that this view of mathematics is carried into his later philosophy.
superimposed on one another (cf. Seidenberg 1977, 337) . Here again is an empirical regularity elevated to a rule by its use as a criterion for having divided a brick along its diagonal; parts that can't be superimposed indicate a poorly constructed brick or diagonal.
Commentators complain about superposition. Greaves, for instance, regards it is a weak point in the system of diagrammatic representation (Greaves 2002, 30-2) , though Heath claims that no ancient geometer doubted its legitimacy (ibid.). There is something untoward about superposition, but not what Greaves imagines.
Superposition lies outside the usual system of diagrammatic representation because it is not part of our experience of drawing figures on paper or on the ground. Instead, the grasp of superposition arises from our experience with placing objects on top of one another.
Apparently, traditional geometry comprises more than "different types of graphical construction combined … with sentential deductive arguments" (cf. Greaves 2002, 20) . Ancient geometers used superposition sparingly, not because they held it to be less reliable than the inference techniques which arose from experience with drawing figures, but presumably because it was more complicated and so less pleasing aesthetically. rather than ones that occur in Euclid.
The pair of diagrams in fig. 5 is an ancient way of bringing people to see that the square constructed on the hypotenuse of a right triangle has the same area as the squares constructed on its sides.
How different is this picture-proof from a traditional proof? Pictureproofs don't show their results on their sleeve, as it were; it's necessary to study them for a while, before they reveal their treasure.
Brown puts this point nicely:
Remember, pictures may make a result 'obvious', but obvious and immediate need not be the same thing. Often you will have to work at it for a while. But that failure will be due not to a perceived inequality, but rather to an inability to grasp a conceptual relation.
Picture-proofs, as well as proofs in Euclid, presuppose that the reasoner has mastered the skill of treating an empirical object by means of exact, mathematical concepts. They differ from Euclidean proofs only in their informality, i.e., in the way in which they leave in the background the conceptual maneuvers necessary for the proof to succeed.
At this point, a general characterization of the role of a diagram in geometrical argumentation is appropriate. There is, in fact, a dual role. In the first place, a diagram serves as the ground for synthesizing a mathematical rule from existing concepts and inference rules. Without the diagram there is no object to which the rules may be applied, and so no construction is possible. The formalist will not brook this claim, of course, but even he has to recognize within it a kernel of truth. Formal proofs proceed by first assuming some object a possesses a property " and then drawing further inferences about a by instantiating the axioms to a and applying them. The absurdity arises from two circumstances. On the one hand the stipulation that !HDA is acute 7 entails that !HLA, which is internal and opposite to !HDA, is also less than !HDA and so itself acute. On the other hand, the stipulation that !MAD is right, in conjunction with the diagrammatically evident fact that !MAL contains !MAD, entails that !HLA (which equals !MAL) is obtuse. This would be evident even if the diagram were so poorly drawn that !MAL and !MAD both appeared to be acute. Here too, although the diagrammatically evident fact is an empirical feature of the diagram, we treat that feature as a rule.
Thus, some but not all perceptual characteristics of a diagram function in a geometric proof; they are, I reiterate, topological rather than metric characteristics. They correspond to the simplest and most general aspects of our experience with physical objects, aspects which are so pervasive that they have been elevated to the position of rules. §3. Beyond Geometrical Diagrams. My account of diagrammatic reasoning is modeled upon the use of diagrams in traditional geometry.
But perhaps not all diagrammatic reasoning fits this mold. Brown suggests this when he distinguishes a diagram which functions by being "isomorphic, or at least homomorphic, to the situation it represents" from a diagram which exhibits no such relation ( fig. 8 ).
[ Brown is worried about the diagram in fig. 8 because it applies only to a particular number but establishes the result for a whole class of numbers. Such diagrams are isomorphic to number structures with that particular cardinality, but they are not isomorphic to all the numbers. And even though the diagram is homomorphic to the whole number structure, Brown argues that there is no reason to suppose that the homomorphism sheds light on the whole structure (ibid.). This worry reflects too great a concern for the perceptual characteristics of the diagram and insufficient concern for the conceptual resources -the exact metric concepts -which the reasoner brings to bear upon the diagram.
The diagram in fig. 8 contains seven squares along its left side and its base. This is learned by counting, though one probably needs to count just the squares in the side or the base, as the symmetry of the figure leads one to conclude that the number is the same in both cases. As well, the figure contains 21 white squares and 7 half-black and half-white squares. Do any of these specific numbers function in 7 I challenge any reader who still suspects that the summit angles of a Saccheri quadrilateral are analogous to the duck-rabbit to try to see !HDA as acute. , 1999, 36-7; 43-4) .
The issue that concerns Brown most, the generality of a diagram employed in a number-theoretic proof, turns out to be no greater problem than that posed by using a particular diagram in proving a result about all triangles or all squares. In order to generalize
properly from a diagram, no features of the diagram (including features that result from letting a particular element in the diagram be ") can be employed unless they are shared by any figure which the result is alleged to cover. Fig. 8 applies unproblematically to any whole number because the proof appeals to no features of the particular numbers that occur in the diagram (such as the fact that 7 is prime and 28 is perfect) in deriving the result. Brown's worry that the elements of the diagram are not isomorphic to number structures with different cardinalities is not an issue; I suspect he has this worry because he assigns to important a role to the perceptual characteristics of the diagram. But the success of the proof does not depend on our perception of the number of elements in one or another part of the diagram. It depends only on our being able to see that certain parts of the diagram have the same number of elements, a fact which we can perceive without knowing the specific numbers, i.e., without counting.
The account of diagrammatic reasoning gleaned from traditional geometric practice extends, apparently, beyond that practice to proofs in number theory. Moreover, the fact that the example discussed employs both geometric and arithmetic rules fits well with the earlier contention that diagrammatic reasoning is just a special case of applied mathematics. A craftsman who applies mathematical rules to objects in the world pays little attention to the circumstance that some of these rules are geometric and others arithmetic. It is not surprising that the same should be true in the context of a diagrammatic proof, if such proofs are just a special case of applied mathematics.
Conclusion. I won't claim to have given a complete picture of diagrammatic reasoning. But I believe I have shown that an account of diagrammatic reasoning that avoids abstract objects competes well with existing Platonistic accounts, especially because the latter fail to capture the range of practices comprised in diagrammatic reasoning.
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Author Biography: David Sherry is fortunate to be professor of philosophy at Northern Arizona University. But this is absurd because by construction !MAL> right !MAD and !HLA is internal and opposite, and so less than acute !HDA. Hence, DH>AM and so CD>AB. 
